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Abstract: Every third dispute brought to the WTO and not withdrawn early is
settled amicably through a mutually agreed solution (MAS). This includes
high-proﬁle and long-standing WTO disputes such as EC–Bananas or Softwood
Lumber. By offering a negotiated solution to hard cases, MAS have added stability
to the multilateral trading system. MAS, however, also raise concerns. Settlements
favour the instant resolution of disputes, but may conﬂict with third party interests
and collective stakes. Where WTO members use their MAS to contract out of
WTO law (‘WTO+ ’/‘WTO–’MAS), the multilateral trading system may be at risk.
In addition, new forms of bilateral (interim-)settlements not foreseen in the
DSU have recently emerged which currently escape multilateral disciplines.
This article assesses how well the DSU balances the competing interests
involved in amicable settlements, preserving the contractual ﬂexibility of
disputants while safeguarding multilateral interests. Contributing to current
DSU reform debates, the article rejects the need for greater MAS enforceability,
endorses the strengthening of procedural and substantive safeguards protecting
collective stakeholders in settlements, and calls for new DSU disciplines on
interim-settlements.
1. Introduction
According to DSU Article 3.7, an amicable settlement is the outcome ‘clearly to be
preferred’ by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Of about 450 cases formally
brought before the WTO, over 200 were settled or are presumed to have been
settled amicably by the disputing parties in one way or another.1 Among the settled
disputes are some of the most contentious and well-known WTO cases. In
November 2012, a mutually agreed solution (MAS) brought the EC–Bananas
dispute between the EU and ten Latin American countries over the former’s
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discriminatory import regime for bananas from non-ACP countries to an end.2
The ‘banana war’ had preoccupied the GATT and WTO for almost 20 years.
Furthermore, already in 2009, the two high-proﬁle SPS cases, EC–Biotech, con-
cerning the EU’s market access restrictions on genetically modiﬁed agricultural
products, and EC–Hormones, relating to the EU’s import ban on hormone-treated
beef, had, in part, been settled.3 These recently resolved disputes highlight the
importance of amicable settlements for the WTO, especially as a solution for hard
cases where litigation risks becoming endless and compliance is politically
impossible.
Yet in spite of their signiﬁcance, amicable settlements have not attracted much
academic attention. Scholars have either focused on particular settlements or
limited their analysis to speciﬁc legal aspects of MAS, such as their possible
enforcement through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.4 A narrow focus on
single disputes or MAS enforcement, however, falls short of addressing the many
intricate questions amicable settlements of WTO disputes give rise to in law and in
practice.
Indeed, amicable settlements are more than private deals struck between dis-
puting parties. Instead, as bilateral solutions in a multilateral system, they point to
two potentially competing aspects of justice in WTO dispute resolution. On the one
hand, amicable settlements help the disputing parties to ﬁnd a swift and tailored
solution to their dispute. On the other hand, bilateral solutions may be reached at
2Notiﬁcation of a Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities –Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas (DS16), (DS27), (DS105), (DS158), European Communities –Regime for
the Importation of Bananas (DS361), (DS364), European Communities –The ACP–EC Partnership
Agreement –Recourse to Arbitration pursuant to the Decision of 14 November 2001 (WT/L/616),
European Communities – The ACP–EC Partnership Agreement – Second Recourse to Arbitration pursuant
to the Decision of 14 November 2001 (WT/L/625); WT/DS27, WT/DS361, WT/DS364, WT/DS16, WT/
DS105, WT/DS158, WT/L/616, and WT/L/625; 8 November 2012.
3 Joint Communication from the European Communities and the United States, European
Communities –Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/28, 30 September
2009. Joint Communication from the European Union and Canada, European Communities –Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/26, 22 March 2011. As for the case
European Communities –Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (EC–
Biotech), a MASwas reached with Canada (Notiﬁcation of aMutually Agreed Solution,WT/DS292/40, 17
July 2009) and Argentina (Notiﬁcation of a Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS293/41, 23 March 2010).
The dispute remains unresolved with the US (WT/DS291).
4 On MAS enforcement, see Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez (2011), ‘Mutually Agreed Solutions under the
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Analytical Framework after the Softwood Lumber
Arbitration’, World Trade Review, 10(3): 343–373. For a consultation-based focus of MAS, see Elisa
Baroncini (1999), ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding as a Promoter of Transparent, Rule-
oriented, Mutually Agreed Solutions –A Study of the Value of DSU Consultations and Their Positive
Conclusion’, in Paolo Mengozzi (ed.), International Trade Law on the 50th Anniversary of the Multilateral
Trading System, Milano, pp. 153–303. For a dispute-based approach, see Leonila Guglya (2011), ‘The
Interplay of International Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Softwood Lumber Controversy’, Journal
of International Dispute Settlement, 2(1): 175–207.
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the expense of third parties or may undermine collective interests. ‘Out-of-court’
settlements risk to ‘work in favor of “private peace” and in opposition to “public
justice”’.5 This tension was aptly captured in a statement made by John Jackson
some 15 years ago. He asked ‘what should be the fundamental objective of
the [multilateral trading] system – to solve the instant dispute (by conciliation,
obfuscation, power-threats, or otherwise), or to promote certain longer term
systemic goals such as predictability and stability of interpretations of treaty text?’6
Nowhere in the WTO’s dispute settlement system is the balancing of these
potentially competing objectives more acute than with respect to negotiated
settlements. Multilateral considerations and ‘longer term systemic goals’ may
generally be absent when it comes to deals struck between two disputing states
where bilateral interests and the goal of solving ‘the instant dispute’ are paramount.
As a result, one must ask whether the WTO regulates amicable settlements in a way
that preserves their beneﬁts for complainants while advancing and protecting the
multilateral stakes of the WTO system.
This analysis needs to take place against the backdrop of the actual settlement
practice of WTO members where two trends have emerged. First, similar to the
better-known practice of concluding preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in
deviation of WTO disciplines,7 WTO members have used MAS to contract out
of WTO law (‘WTO–’ MAS) or to add to WTO obligations (‘WTO+ ’ MAS).
In the Softwood LumberMAS between Canada and the United States, for instance,
both parties waived their right to initiate WTO proceedings (‘WTO–’) and agreed
on speciﬁc disciplines and institutional mechanisms (‘WTO+ ’) to govern their
bilateral softwood lumber trade.8 Although this practice demonstrates that MAS
confer much needed ﬂexibility on disputants when dealing with hard or
multijurisdictional cases, such contracting-out may conﬂict with larger WTO
systemic goals. So where does the WTO draw the line between legal and illegal
MAS?
Second, in recent years, WTOmembers have added a further layer of complexity.
Instead of signing MAS as the category of amicable settlements that the DSU
explicitly recognizes, encourages, and regulates in paragraphs 5 to 7 of Article 3,
5 Carrie Menkel-Meadow (1995), ‘Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic
Defence of Settlement (in Some Cases)’, Georgetown Law Journal, 83: 2663–2696, at 2667. On the
domestic side of the settlements debate, see also Owen M. Fiss (1984), ‘Against Settlements’, Yale Law
Journal, 93: 1073–1090 and David Luban (1995), ‘Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm’,
Georgetown Law Journal, 83: 2619–2662.
6 John H. Jackson (1998), ‘Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems’, Journal of
International Economic Law, 1(3): 329–351, at 331 (emphasis added).
7 Gabrielle Marceau (2009), ‘News from Geneva on RTAs and WTO-plus, WTO-more, and WTO-
minus’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting American Society of International Law, 103: 25–28 March
2009, 124–128.
8Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, United States –Reviews of Countervailing Duty on
Softwood Lumber from Canada (US–Softwood Lumber), WT/DS311/2, 16 November 2006.
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WTOmembers have concluded interim-settlements not foreseen in the DSU. These
agreements typically outline compliance steps towards a ﬁnal solution of the
dispute, and pledge notiﬁcation as a MAS at a later stage. In 2010, for example,
a ‘Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution’ was negotiated in the US–Upland
Cotton dispute.9 Similarly, in early 2012, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) was reached to end the US–Zeroing cases.10 The rise of these interim-
settlements is accompanied by an overall decrease in the number of WTO disputes
settled through MAS in recent years (see section 2 below).
In light of these trends and the competing interests involved in settlements, this
article provides an in-depth discussion of the procedural and substantive regulation
of amicable settlements in the WTO. It ﬁnds that the DSU and Appellate Body
jurisprudence have so far succeeded fairly well in preserving the contractual
ﬂexibility of disputants while also safeguarding the interests of other WTO
stakeholders. There is room for improvement though. While calls for an automatic
MAS enforcement made in the context of DSU reform debates are unwarranted,
other DSU amendments should be made to increase clarity and promptness in MAS
notiﬁcation. Furthermore, the system needs urgent improvement when it comes to
integrating the new practice of interim-settlement into DSU structures as part of a
newly proposed two stage settlement procedure.
After this introduction, section 2 provides an overview of the law and practice of
amicable settlements in the WTO, exposing recent settlement trends. Section 3
identiﬁes the competing judicial policy considerations raised in settlements and
develops a framework for subsequent analysis. Building on these benchmarks, the
remainder of the article evaluates how well the DSU preserves the advantages of
settlements and mitigates their drawbacks. Section 4 traces the historical evolution
of amicable settlements of trade disputes from a purely diplomatic tool to a more
circumscribed and regulated element of the multilateral trading system. Section 5
discusses the conceptual and practical challenges of deﬁning and managing
settlements in a hybrid system such as the DSU that combines consensual and
adjudicatory elements. Section 6 forms the centrepiece of the study providing an
analysis of the regulation of MAS in DSU Articles 3.5–7 and jurisprudence.
Building on these ﬁndings, section 7 concludes on an evaluation of current DSU
reform efforts with respect to settlements.
9 Joint Communication from Brazil and the United States, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/45, 31 August 2010.
10 Joint Communication from the United States and Japan, United States –Measures Relating to
Zeroing and Sunset Reviews, WT/DS322/44, 8 February 2012. Joint Communication from the European
Communities and the United States, United States –Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating
DumpingMargins (‘Zeroing’), WT/DS294/43, andUnited States –Continued Existence and Application of
Zeroing Methodology, WT/DS350/20, 8 February 2012.
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2. MAS – an overview of law and practice
2.1 MAS and the DSU
Since the inception of the GATT, two competing views on how to solve trade
disputes have occupied diplomats and academics alike. Some argue that disputes
are best settled through negotiation and compromise; not legal principles and
lawyers, but economic policy and diplomats should be the driving forces in the
dispute settlement procedure. Others have advanced the opposite view, arguing for
a more judicial and legalistic settlement of disputes involving a neutral third-party
adjudicator.11
Today’s DSU, as John Jackson observed, contains elements of both views.12
It provides a right to adjudication to complainants, quasi automaticity in the
adoption of panel reports, and the possibility of appeal on matters of law. On the
other hand, the DSU mandates consultations, preserves a preference for mutually
agreed settlements of disputes, and requires panels to facilitate settlements between
the parties. Hence, the resolution of disputes occurs today through a hybrid system
combining diplomatic and adjudicatory elements.
In this hybrid system, amicable solutions of WTO disputes are explicitly
regulated. DSU Article 1.1 states that the Agreement also applies to ‘consultations
and the settlement of disputes between Members’. The aim of the DSU is to ‘secure
a positive solution to a dispute’ pursuant to Article 3.7. That same Article envisages
four different remedies. Mutually agreed solutions by the parties to a dispute that
are consistent with the WTO agreements are the preferred remedy. Only if no such
solution can be reached, the primary goal becomes the withdrawal of the incon-
sistent measures. In case of non-compliance, members may have access to the two
remedies of last resort: temporary compensation and the suspension of concessions.
Hence, the DSU establishes a clear hierarchy of remedies in which consensual
dispute resolution trumps adjudication.
The preference for MAS is reﬂected throughout the stages of the DSU. Article 4.3
clariﬁes that the aim of consultations – the ﬁrst step of the WTO dispute settlement
procedure – is to reach a mutually satisfactory solution to a dispute. When con-
sultations fail and a panel is established, the panel should give the parties ‘adequate
opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution’ in accordance with DSU
Article 11. Only if parties do not arrive at a MAS, a panel shall submit its legal
ﬁndings to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for adoption pursuant to Article
12.7. Taken together with DSU Article 15, which allows parties to review and
comment on a panel report before it is circulated among members, these provisions
11 John H. Jackson (1998), ‘Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Policy and Jurisprudential
Considerations’, School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, Discussion Paper, No. 419, at 2–3. See
also Robert E. Hudec (1980), ‘GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unﬁnished Business’,
Cornell International Law Journal, 13: 145–204, at 151–153.
12 Jackson, ‘Dispute Settlement in the WTO’, supra n. 6, at 15, 22.
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enable members to forego a DSB ruling, by reaching a MAS, until the very last
minute of the panel process.13 Finally, also during the compliance phase, a solution
agreed upon by the parties to the dispute can either prevent retaliation altogether as
per Article 22.2 or end the suspension of concessions in accordance with Article
22.8. In sum, MAS are available to disputing parties throughout the stages of the
WTO dispute settlement procedure.
To align the preference for bilateral settlements with the overall multilateral
nature of the WTO system, MAS are conditioned by two obligations, which the
Panel in EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador) called MAS’ ‘multilateral
elements’.14 First, DSU Article 3.515 mandates that settlements between the
disputing parties, like any other solution to disputes raised under the DSU, have to
be consistent with the WTO covered agreements and shall neither nullify or impair
beneﬁts, nor frustrate any objective arising from these agreements. Second, MAS
have to be notiﬁed in compliance with DSU Article 3.616 to all relevant WTO
bodies where other members can raise any point of concern.
2.2 MAS in practice
About every third WTO dispute that is not withdrawn early ends with a formally
notiﬁed MAS.17 Until December 2012, WTO members formally notiﬁed 80
MAS.18 Of these settlements, 49% had been reached at the consultation stage, 22%
during panel proceedings, and 29% in the course of the compliance phase.
13 See also Armin Steinbach (2009), ‘The DSU Interim Review –Need for Its Elimination or Extension
to the Appellate Body Stage’, Journal of International Economic Law, 12(2): 417–434.
14 Panel Report, European Communities –Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas –Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador (EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador)),
WT/DS27/RW/ECU, adopted 6 May 1999, para. 7.102.
15 DSU Article 3.5: ‘All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of the covered agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with
those agreements and shall not nullify or impair beneﬁts accruing to any Member under those agreements,
nor impede the attainment of any objective of those agreements.’ The same requirement of consistency is
repeated in DSU Article 3.7.
16 DSU Article 3.6: ‘Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be notiﬁed to the DSB and the relevant
Councils and Committees, where any Member may raise any point relating thereto.’
17Miguel Burnier da Silveira, Andreas Sennekamp, and Werner Zdouc (2010), ‘Die Bedeutung der
konsensualen Elemente des WTO-Streitbeilegungsverfahrens in der Lösung internationaler
Handelskonﬂikte’, in Universität Graz, Konﬂiktlösung im Konsens, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Diversion,
Mediation, Tagungsband zum 7, Fakultätstag, Graz, 28–50, at 34. More cases are presumed to have been
settled, in which no formal MAS notiﬁcation occurred. See Kara M. Reynolds (2007), ‘Why Are So Many
WTO Disputes Abandoned?’, American University Washington DC, Department of Economics Working
Paper Series, No. 2007-05.
18 This number is the result of a careful review of the individual dispute settlement records available at
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm. Multi-dispute settlements are counted as sum
of the individually ﬁled disputes involved. MAS not formally notiﬁed and not included in the records of
individual disputes are not counted, even if their existence may be discerned based on minutes from DSB
meetings. Hence, the number of actual (including not notiﬁed) MAS will thus be higher. Because of the
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MAS occur across the entire range of WTO disputes. They resolve cases over
trade in goods, services, and intellectual property rights. Furthermore, both devel-
oping and developed countries engage in MAS. Some MAS, such as the Softwood
Lumber Agreement, take the form of binding international agreements.19 Other
settlements are limited to a simple letter exchange indicating a compromise.20
Often, the notiﬁcation of a MAS includes references to a piece of domestic
legislation that brought an allegedly inconsistent measure into WTO conformity,
e.g. by amending a discriminatory tariff schedule.21 In other instances, parties agree
on transition periods and gradual implementation measures.22 Certain MAS, as in
the Softwood Lumber litigation, end multiple WTO cases over a similar matter
involving the same disputants.23 Other settlements, as in the India–Quantitative
Restrictions disputes, comprise one MAS relating to complaints by different
members over the same measure.24 Interestingly, such multi-party MAS, usually
signed simultaneously and having the same content, constitute roughly half of all
disputes resolved through MAS. In addition, certain MAS involve settlements
between only some but not all of the claimants.25 Finally, MAS sometimes link
different levels of trade governance. The 2006 settlement of the Softwood Lumber
methodology used this number may diverge from other counts, e.g. from that of Burnier da Silveira et al.,
Die Bedeutung der konsensualen Elemente, supra n. 17. MAS formally notiﬁed under Article 3.6 until
September 2011 are also listed in the WTOAnalytical Index under DSU Article 3.6 amounting to 66MAS,
see www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/dsu_01_e.htm#article3B5. This (in contrast to
our count) does not include several MAS concluded at the implementation stage, e.g. the Communication
from Japan and the United States, Japan –Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/12, 30
August 2001.
19Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, United States –Reviews of Countervailing Duty on
Softwood Lumber from Canada (US–Softwood Lumber), WT/DS311/2, 16 November 2006.
20 For examples, see Baroncini, ‘TheWTODispute Settlement Understanding’, supra n. 4, at 252–254.
Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘Mutually Agreed Solutions’, supra n. 4, at 348.
21 For instance, Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, Panama – Tariff Classiﬁcation of Certain
Milk Products, WT/DS329/2, 6 October 2005.
22 For instance, Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, United States –Measures Affecting Textiles
and Apparel Products (II), WT/DS151/10, 31 July 2000.
23 The Softwood Lumber dispute involved six WTO cases. See Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed
Solution,United States –Reviews of Countervailing Duty on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS311/
2, 16 November 2006. For detailed discussion, see Leonila Guglya (2011), ‘The Interplay of International
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Softwood Lumber Controversy’, Journal of International Dispute
Settlement, 2(1): 175–207.
24 For instance, in the case India –Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products (India–Quantitative Restrictions), the complainants by Australia (WT/DS91), Canada
(WT/DS92), the EC (WT/DS96), New Zealand (WT/DS93), Switzerland (WT/DS94), and the US (WT/
DS90) were settled in a MAS see Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution Addendum, India–Quantitative
Restrictions, WT/DS90/2/Add.1, WT/DS91/2/Add.1, WT/DS92/2/Add.1, WT/DS93/2/Add.1, WT/DS94/
2/Add.1, WT/DS96/2/Add.1, 14 January 1999. It is noteworthy that this happened although the
consultation requests were slightly different. Switzerland, for instance, did not claim a violation of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
25 For example, the European Communities –Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products (EC–Biotech) case involved three complainants: the US (WT/DS/291), Canada (WT/DS/
292), and Argentina (WT/DS/291). While a MAS was reached with Canada (Notiﬁcation of a Mutually
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dispute involving Canada and the US included a Termination of Litigation
Agreement that settled 20 national, NAFTA, and WTO proceedings.26
2.3 Recent settlement trends: the rise of interim-settlements
When looking at the settlement practice of WTO members over time, two trends
become visible. First, the number of notiﬁed MAS has decreased in recent years.
While in 1998 the number of MAS peaked with 15 settlements notiﬁed, this num-
ber dropped to zero in 2011. The sudden surge in 2012 is due to the EC–Bananas
MAS, which settled six WTO disputes. It remains to be seen whether this points to
a reversal of the downward trend.(ﬁgure 1)
Second, members are instead concluding new forms of (interim-)settlements not
foreseen in the DSU. These include Memoranda of Understanding, which envisage
steps towards a ﬁnal settlement that is then to be notiﬁed as MAS pursuant to
DSU Article 3.6. In addition, other forms of sui-generis settlements have emerged
which also typically contain a pledge of future Article 3.6 notiﬁcation. They involve
high-proﬁle cases such as the ‘Framework for a Mutually Agreed Solution’ in the
US–Upland Cotton dispute27 and the 2009 ‘Geneva Agreement on Bananas’28
preceding the 2012 Bananas MAS. Over the last ﬁve years, ten MoUs and three
other sui-generis settlements have been concluded (see table 1). In other words,
recently WTO members have de facto introduced the new category of interim-
settlements into the WTO dispute settlement process.
3. Regulating settlements: a balancing exercise
Bilateral settlements in a multilateral context raise intricate judicial policy
considerations that require balancing. On the one hand, amicable settlements can
restore ‘peace’ between the disputing parties. On the other hand, collective values
should not be upset or third parties’ rights impaired by the dispute’s resolution. To
fully appreciate how the DSU does or does not achieve this balance, it is useful to
divide the trade-offs associated with amicable settlements of WTO disputes into
three categories, which will be brieﬂy discussed in turn. The ﬁrst category com-
prises the risks and opportunities of settlements for the disputing parties. The
second and third categories refer to settlements’ procedural and substantive trade-
offs between the disputants and collective stakeholders affected by the WTO
Agreed Solution, WT/DS292/40, 17 July 2009) and Argentina (Notiﬁcation of a Mutually Agreed
Solution, WT/DS293/41, 23 March 2010), the dispute remains unresolved with the US.
26Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, US–Softwood Lumber, supra n. 8, at Annex 2A.
27 Joint Communication from Brazil and the United States, United States – Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, WT/DS267/45, 31 August 2010.
28 Communication from Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, European Union, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Geneva
Agreement on Bananas, WT/L/784, 15 December 2009.
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dispute settlement process, namely domestic traders and consumers, third WTO
members, and the WTO system at large.
3.1 MAS and the disputing parties
MAS29 promise several beneﬁts to disputing parties. First, settlements help the
disputants to avoid unnecessary costs and delays in litigation. This is particularly
important in the WTO which only provides for prospective remedies but not
damages for past harm.30 Second, they allow WTO members to retain control
over the dispute settlement process and its outcome. Settlement negotiations can
broaden the issues under consideration opening the door for horse-trading and
side-payments, impossible under normal panel proceedings.
MAS also involve risks for the disputants. Settlement negotiations may become
subject to power asymmetries with powerful members bullying smaller countries
Figure 1. MAS and interim-settlements based on their year of notiﬁcation to the
WTO
29 For the purpose of this section, we use the term MAS to refer to amicable settlements of WTO
disputes. For a more detailed appreciation of the deﬁnition of MAS and its relationship to other negotiated
agreements such as MoUs, see section 5 below.
30 Exporters thus have an incentive to push their governments into an early settlement to resume
normal trading. See Amelia Porges (2003), ‘Settling WTO Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?’,
Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 19(1): 141–184, at 145.
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Table 1. Interim-settlements
Dispute number Claimant Respondent Case name
Year of
notiﬁcation
Document
number
Memorandum of Understanding
26 US EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 2009 WT/DS26/29
48 Canada EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) 2011 WT/DS48/26
294 EC US United States –Laws, Regulations and Methodology for
Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing)
2012 WT/DS294/43
322 Japan US United States –Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews 2012 WT/DS322/44
350 EC US United States –Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology
2012 WT/DS350/20
358 US China Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions
from Taxes and Other Payments
2007 WT/DS358/14
359 Mexico China Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions
from Taxes and Other Payments
2007 WT/DS359/14
372 EC China Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign
Financial Information Suppliers
2008 WT/DS372/4
373 US China Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign
Financial Information Suppliers
2008 WT/DS373/4
378 Canada China Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign
Financial Information Suppliers
2008 WT/DS378/3
Sui generis settlements
27 Ecuador; Guatemala;
Honduras; Mexico; US
EC Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas 2009 WT/L/784
193 EC Chile Measures affecting the Transit and Importing of Swordﬁsh 2010 WT/DS193/4
267 Brazil US Subsidies on Upland Cotton 2010 WT/DS267/45
74
W
O
L
F
G
A
N
G
A
L
S
C
H
N
E
R
at https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745613000165
D
ow
nloaded from
 https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core. U
niversity of B
asel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:43:26, subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available
into signing a MAS.31 The DSU’s adjudicatory elements alleviate some of these
inequalities, casting a ‘shadow of the law’ over settlement negotiations.32 However,
powerful countries still possess means outside of the WTO to buy off or deter their
smaller negotiating partner. In a case study, Shanker concluded that ‘Argentina
appears to have been coerced into agreeing to amend its use of anti-competition
provisions in its patent acts’33 in a 2002 US–Argentina MAS.34 The United States
supposedly asserted pressure bilaterally and through the IMF, taking advantage of
the Argentinean economic crisis in the early 2000s in order to ‘dictate a series of
changes in Argentina’s Patent Acts through “Mutually Agreed Solution”’.35 A
second concern for the disputants relates to compliance with and enforcement
of MAS. Baroncini’s review of early MAS practice ﬁnds multiple instances of
parties to MAS complaining about divergent interpretations and unsatisfactory
implementation.36 Moreover, alleged non-compliance with the terms of aMAS was
raised in two complaints brought to WTO panels (see section 6). Hence, power
asymmetries and enforcement problems are the main pre-occupation of disputants
in MAS.
3.2 Procedural balancing: transparency versus conﬁdentiality
Aside from balancing competing interests of the disputants, MAS also raise
important trade-offs between the interests of collective stakeholders and those of
the disputants. Procedurally, disputants may ﬁnd it necessary to keep their nego-
tiations conﬁdential in order to resolve delicate and politically controversial
disputes. DSU Article 4.6 recognizes the need for negotiations behind closed doors,
mandating consultations to remain conﬁdential.
The requirement of conﬁdentiality, however, may conﬂict with the interests of
other stakeholders in transparency of bilateral settlements. First, domestic
stakeholders may bear the costs of settlements that escape their democratic control.
According to Petersmann, the WTO serves an important constitutional function by
protecting economic liberties and individual consumer rights from protectionist
31 Johan Lindeque and Steven McGuire (2007), ‘The United States and Trade Disputes in the World
Trade Organization: Hegemony Constrained or Conﬁrmed?’, Management International Review, 47(5):
725–744, at 729, 734–735.
32Marc Busch and Eric Reinhardt (2000), ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in
GATT/WTO Disputes’, Fordham International Law Journal, 24(1): 158–172. John H. Jackson (1997),
The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edn, MIT Press, at
109–110.
33Daya Shanker (2004), ‘Argentina–US Mutually Agreed Solution, Economic Crisis in Argentina and
Failure of the WTO Dispute Settlement System’, Idea: Journal of Law and Technology, 44(4): 565–615, at
571.
34Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Conditions Set Forth in the Agreement,
Argentina–Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test Data, WT/DS171/3, WT/DS196/4, 20
June 2002.
35 Shanker, ‘Argentina–US Mutually Agreed Solution’, supra n. 33, at 566.
36 Baroncini, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding’, supra n. 4, at 260–275.
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tendencies in their government.37 For democratic checks and balances to work,
domestic stakeholders require access to information, including those relating to
bilateral settlements. Second, other WTO members equally want MAS to be
transparent. By not disclosing the terms of a settlement, disputants may prevent
other WTO members from claiming most-favoured-nation (MFN) advantages
arising out of a settlement. Moreover, other WTO members have an interest in
scrutinizing MAS to ensure that such settlements are not struck at their expense
more generally. Third, MAS also affect the multilateral trading system as a whole.
Panel and Appellate Body reports provide an important public good function
safeguarding security and predictability of trade rules and reinforcing trade expec-
tations. Settlements, when kept private and conﬁdential, fail to further other
members’ understanding of states’ trade-related behaviour. If they are made public,
however, they can generate positive externalities not unlike ﬁndings by adjudica-
tors, providing guidance on how hard cases can be solved amicably. Therefore,
transparency of settlements is a stake common to domestic consumers and traders,
third parties, as well as the system at large.
3.3 Substantive balancing: ﬂexibility versus WTO consistency
Substantively, MAS offer additional ﬂexibility to disputants which may potentially
be detrimental to other stakeholders, particularly if compared to an outcome
reached through adjudication. WTO panels and the Appellate Body aim to preserve
the overall balance of trade concessions with a view to safeguarding not only the
interests of the disputants but of the WTO membership as a whole. Accordingly,
recommendations by the DSB ‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
in the covered agreements’ pursuant to DSU Article 3.2. While some settlements
produce an outcome effectively identical to what would have been reached through
adjudications, other MAS do what WTO adjudicators cannot do: adding to or
diminishing rights and obligations.
Disputants may reach ‘WTO–’ settlements that are more limited in scope than a
potential panel report leaving possible violations unaddressed or waiving rights
conferred by the covered agreements. In ‘WTO–’ MAS, disputants effectively
contract out of WTO law. In some MAS, for instance, disputants waived their right
to initiate further DSU proceedings.38 Disputants may also agree on ‘WTO+ ’
37 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2002), ‘Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State-centered
Approach towards a Human Rights Approach in International Economic Law’, in Kennedy and
Southwick (eds.) (2002), The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert
Hudec, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 32–67. Also producers see their risk premium
decrease and proﬁt margins increase in a more stable and predictable world trading system, see Jackson,
‘Dispute Settlement and the WTO’, supra 6, at 17.
38 For instance, in the case Chile –Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordﬁsh. ‘In
addition, Chile and the European Union hereby notify the Dispute Settlement Body and the Council for
Trade in Goods that they have unconditionally agreed that neither party shall further exercise any
procedural right accruing to it under the DSU in case DS193 Chile–Measures Affecting the Transit and
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settlements that could be more comprehensive than panel reports. This may take
the form of additional rights, commitments, and side-payments. For instance in
the EC–Biotech case, the EU concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with
Argentina and Canada respectively, setting up a bilateral dialog on biotechnology
in agriculture.39 Another example is the ‘Trade in Cement Agreement’ between
Mexico and the US which aside from solving a WTO dispute over US anti-dumping
measures on cement from Mexico also settled NAFTA panel proceedings and
comprehensively addressed the trade in cement between the two countries.40
These ‘WTO–/WTO+ ’ MAS may be problematic when it comes to the interests
of other stakeholders. In settlements, disputants have an incentive to internalize the
beneﬁts of settlements, but to externalize their costs.41 Disputants may thus strike
private deals at the expense of other stakeholders. For instance, in a dispute over
Japan’s import quota on laver (seaweed), which, among other things, is used to
prepare sushi, South Korea agreed to a MAS in which Japan promised to allocate
its annual import quota exclusively to Korean laver products.42 The WTO
consistency of the settlement has been called ‘dubious’.43 The DSU thus needs to
protect the interests of domestic stakeholders, third parties, and the WTO mem-
bership at large by limiting the contractual freedom of disputants in MAS.
Additionally, other WTO members may need to be able to react if their rights are
indeed threatened. This raises the question of whether MAS can be challenged, e.g.
before a panel, if they do conﬂict with third party rights.
3.4 Conclusion: a framework for analysis
In sum, MAS raise balancing considerations in at least two ways. First, between the
disputants – the beneﬁts and drawbacks of settlements need to be balanced out.
While they hope for a prompt, cost-saving, and need-based settlement, claimant
and respondent are concerned with power asymmetries and enforcement questions
in settlements. Second, the interests between disputants and collective stakeholders
require balancing, since MAS work primarily towards ‘instant dispute resolution’
and not ‘systemic goals’. Procedurally, disputants may favour conﬁdential settle-
ments, whereas other stakeholders ask for transparency. Substantively, disputants
Importation of Swordﬁsh.’ Chile –Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordﬁsh – Joint
Communication from the European Union and Chile –Addendum, WT/DS193/4, 3 June 2010.
39European Communities –Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products
Notiﬁcation of a Mutually Agreed Solution (Canada), WT/DS292/40, 17 July 2009 and Notiﬁcation of a
Mutually Agreed Solution (Argentina), WT/DS293/41, 23 March 2010.
40Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, US –Anti-Dumping Measures on Cement from Mexico,
WT/DS281/8, 21 May 2007.
41 Luban, ‘Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm’, supra n. 5, at 2626, 2652–2653.
42Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, Japan – Import Quotas on Dried Laver and Seasoned
Laver, WT/DS323/5, 27 January 2006.
43 Junji Nakagawa (2007), ‘NoMore Negotiated Deals?: Settlement of Trade and Investment Disputes
in East Asia’, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(4): 837–867, at 856–858.
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value ﬂexibility in settlement outcomes. In contrast, third parties and the system at
large have an interest in constraining this ﬂexibility to harmonize MAS with
collective stakes (ﬁgure 2). In the remainder of this article, we will use this
framework to determine how successful the WTO balances competing interests in
settlements looking at the system’s evolution (section 4), the deﬁnition of MAS
(section 5), and the procedural and substantive regulation of MAS in DSU Articles
3.5–7 (section 6).
4. The history of regulating MAS
How a dispute settlement system balances the competing interests involved in
amicable settlements depends on that system’s overarching design and objectives.
In the context of international trade, amicable settlements have been subject to
increasing regulation and multilateral controls as a result of the trading system’s
evolution. From GATT’s inception in 1947 to the creation of the WTO in 1994, the
international trading system underwent a gradual ‘legalization’.44 It developed
from a ‘power-oriented’ to a ‘rule-oriented’ diplomacy.45 In the course of this trans-
formation, the dispute settlement mechanism became increasingly adjudicatory
Figure 2. Stakes, stakeholders and balancing considerations in WTO settlements
Disputants Collective Stakeholders 
Instant Dispute Resolution/ 
Private Peace 
Systemic Goals/ 
Public Justice 
Claimant 
Respondent 
Domestic Traders and 
Consumers 
Third WTO Members 
WTO System 
    Confidentiality vs Transparency 
    Flexibility vs Safeguards 
    Power 
Asymmetry 
Compliance/  
Enforcement 
vs 
Procedure 
Substantive Outcome 
44 Judith Goldstein and Lisa L. Martin (2000), ‘Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic
Politics: A Cautionary Note’, International Organization, 54(3): 603–632, at 604–605.
45 Jackson, The World Trading System, supra n. 32, at 109–111.
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without, however, altogether losing its diplomatic elements. The increasing
regulation of MAS through multilateral safeguards is an epitome of this broader
evolution.
The early GATT 1947 dispute settlement procedure was based on GATTArticles
XXII and XXIII. Article XXII foresees consultations aiming to ‘ﬁnd a satisfactory
solution’ to the dispute. If the parties failed to reach a bilateral solution, the matter
was referred to the GATT contracting parties for collective deliberation.46 Hence,
in contrast to today’s adjudicatory elements, ‘GATT’s enforcement mechanism
(Article XXIII) was a diplomatic procedure’.47 In other words, if bilateral
negotiation failed, multilateral settlement talks took over with a view to
maintaining a balance of concessions.
In the years following GATT’s inception, the dispute resolution process
underwent a gradual legalization. The procedure ‘transformed from a purely
diplomatic exercise to a modiﬁed form of third-party adjudication’.48 It was in this
context during the Tokyo Negotiation Round, that the contracting parties adopted
the Understanding Regarding Notiﬁcation, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance in 1979.49 The document claims to codify GATT’s ‘customary prac-
tice’ of dispute settlement and adds new elements and clariﬁcations. References to
MAS appear in the document multiple times.50 In many parts, the 1979 Under-
standing forms the basis on which the DSU was later negotiated. For instance,
Annex Article 4 relating to the codiﬁed practice contains the familiar passage:
‘The aim of the Contracting Parties has always been to secure a positive solution to
a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute is clearly to be
preferred.’51 Compared to today’s almost identical DSU Article 3.7, it should be
noted that the qualiﬁcation ‘consistent with the covered agreements’ is still absent.
This insertion was only made in the later stages of the Uruguay Negotiations.52
While the document refers to the central role of MAS as GATT customary
practice, the 1979 Understanding, in fact, ‘re-invents’ GATT history, making
amicable settlements appear to be the primary objective throughout all stages of the
dispute settlement process.53 Hudec calls the 1979 Understanding a ‘rather artful
46GATT Article XXIII:2.
47 Joost Pauwelyn (2005), ‘The Transformation ofWorld Trade’,Michigan LawReview, 104(1): 1–65,
at 14.
48 Ibid., at 20.
49Understanding regarding Notiﬁcation, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, L/4907,
28 November 1979.
50 Ibid., Article 18, and Annex Articles 3, 4, and 6.
51 Ibid., Annex Article 4.
52 The reference is found in so called ‘Dunkel Draft’ in Article 1.7 of the DSU Draft text: ‘A solution
mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the General Agreement is clearly to be
preferred’ (emphasis added), Uruguay Round –Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/FA, 20 December 1991, S.2.
53 Robert E. Hudec (1980), ‘GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unﬁnished
Business’, Cornell International Law Journal, 13: 145–204, at 186.
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revision of GATT history’ and adds that the ‘documents are not, however, meant to
be historical essays. They are statements of current regulatory policy.’54 In fact, the
emphasis placed on reaching a MAS, including at the adjudication stage, was a
response to pressing and speciﬁc concerns among GATT members about ‘wrong
cases’ being brought before GATT panels. ‘Wrong cases’ referred to disputes
irresolvable through adjudication, because highly sensitive domestic political or
economic interests were at stake that would prevent governments from complying
with a panel ruling.55 A widespread practice of non-compliance, it was feared,
would undermine the system’s prestige and functionality.56 Since, at the same time,
the GATT contracting parties sought to strengthen access and efﬁcacy of the
dispute settlement system, the emphasis placed on MAS also during panel proceed-
ings was perceived as a way to solve the ‘wrong case’ problem through more nego-
tiation in dispute settlement without foregoing greater legalization elsewhere.57 In
short, the explicit preference for MAS throughout the dispute settlement stages was
not a remnant from early GATT diplomacy-only-days or subsequent practice, but a
solution to a concrete problem facing trade policy makers in the Tokyo Round and
was introduced together with greater legalization.
Elements protecting the interests of third stakeholders in settlements are still
largely absent in the 1979 Understanding. Only Article 19 contains a collective
safeguard:
if a mutually satisfactory solution is developed by the parties to a dispute before a
panel, any contracting party with an interest in the matter has a right to enquire
about and be given appropriate information about that solution in so far as it
relates to trade matters.
While this insertion is a ﬁrst effort to put in place a transparency mechanism that
allows third countries to verify that a dispute is not settled at their expense, it
remains limited in scope. First, the Article refers only to a MAS developed ‘before a
Panel’. Bilateral settlements concluded at the consultation stage thus remain outside
of the scope of the provision. Second, the right to receive information is restricted to
‘trade matters’. It hence excludes information on non-trade side-payments.
It was only with the Uruguay Round that greater weight was given to collective
interest in bilateral settlements. This occurred in the context of further legalization
and the growing emphasis of the GATT/WTO as the multilateral trading system. A
key document in this regard is the 1989 Improvements to the GATT Dispute
Settlement Rules and Procedures.58 Considering the dispute settlement system as a
54 Ibid., at 186–187.
55 Ibid., at 159–163.
56 Ibid., at 159.
57 Ibid., at 177, 185–188.
58 Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, L/6489, 12 April 1989. For
more information on dispute settlement negotiations in the Uruguay Round, see J. G. Castel (1989), ‘The
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‘beneﬁt of all contracting parties’,59 the membership found it necessary to harness
bilateral solutions for the collective beneﬁt. The 1989 Improvements introduced
two constraints on the contractual freedom of disputants: requiring, ﬁrst, MAS’
conformity with the GATT and, second, their mandatory notiﬁcation.60 These two
innovations regulating MAS both substantively and procedurally were later
incorporated in Articles 3.5 to 7 of the DSU with minor adjustments.
Hence, the evolution of the GATT’s dispute settlement process goes hand in hand
with a stronger regulation of bilateral settlements. Heralded as solution to the
‘wrong case’ problem during the Tokyo Round, it took until the Uruguay Round to
effectively regulate amicable settlements through multilateral procedural and
substantive safeguards in an attempt to align MAS with the interests of other
stakeholders in the multilateral trading system.
5. Deﬁning MAS: practical and conceptual challenges
Before proceeding to analyse how MAS are regulated in today’s DSU, we must
answer one question left unaddressed by the Uruguay Round: When can we speak
of a MAS in the ﬁrst place? While the DSU often refers to MAS, it does not deﬁne
the term. So it is unclear when the regulatory obligations contained in DSU Articles
3.5–7 are triggered. One possibility to deﬁne MAS is to simply defer to WTO
members: whatever agreement they formally notify as MAS pursuant to DSU
Article 3.6 could be considered a MAS.61 Using notiﬁcation as a benchmark for
the existence of a MAS may, however, be both under-inclusive, not capturing nego-
tiated settlements that were never notiﬁed, and over-inclusive, capturing notiﬁed
agreements that actually did not provide a ﬁnal ‘solution’ to a WTO dispute. In
addition, the wording of DSU Article 3.6 stands against such an interpretation. The
obligation to notify is a legal consequence arising from a MAS, but not a pre-
condition for its existence. Hence, notiﬁcation does not prove the existence of a
MAS. Vice versa, non-notiﬁcation of a MAS may result in a violation of DSU
Article 3.6, but it does not invalidate the existence of a settlement in the ﬁrst
place. This is conﬁrmed by the Appellate Body’s ﬁndings in EC–Bananas III
(Article 21.5 –Ecuador). Instead of relying on the parties’ statements in the course
of notiﬁcation, panels should assess the legal implication of a potential MAS
Uruguay Round and the Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures’,
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 38(4): 834–849.
59 Improvements, supra n. 58, Article A.3.
60 Article A.2 requires conformity of ‘all solutions to matters formally raised under the GATT dispute
settlement system’ with GATT disciplines and further mandates that these solutions ‘shall not nullify or
impair beneﬁts accruing to any contracting party under the General Agreement, nor impede the attainment
of any objective of the General Agreement’. Article B.1 stipulates that MAS have to ‘be notiﬁed to the
Council where any contracting party may raise any point relating thereto’.
61 This approach was chosen for the WTO Analytical Index which lists only MAS notiﬁed pursuant to
DSU Article 3.6, see www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/dsu_01_e.htm#article3B5.
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objectively in light of the text of the agreement itself.62 Yet, what is then the
benchmark used for such an objective test? Answering this question will help WTO
bodies and members to better identify agreements that qualify as MAS, which give
rise to the obligations in DSU Articles 3.5–7, and to solve MAS-related disputes.
Aside from developing an objective deﬁnition of MAS, this section will also
demonstrates the need for a two-step legal regime to streamline WTO settlement
practice and explicitly regulate interim-settlements.
5.1 Towards a deﬁnition of MAS: ‘Mutually agreed . . .’
Deﬁning MAS using an objective rather than subjective test is more challenging
than it may seem at ﬁrst sight given the particular design of the DSU. The most
distinctive element of a MAS is its consensual nature. Disputing members negotiate
and agree voluntarily on a solution to a WTO dispute. However, MAS are not the
only element of amicable negotiations in the WTO dispute settlement process. In
fact, the DSU’s hybrid nature of negotiation and adjudication contains a number of
consensual elements, leaving the disputants with considerable ﬂexibility and
control over their disputes. For instance, although WTO panels assess a challenged
measure’s consistency with WTO obligations, they do not, unlike judges in dome-
stic courts, specify what a member has to do to bring a measure into compliance
with WTO law. Hudec thus distinguishes between panel or Appellate Body reports
as outputs of the dispute settlement process and the actual outcome of the dispute,
e.g. how the respondent brings its measure into conformity.63 Due to the difference
between the two, ‘the outputs in WTO disputes almost always permit more than
one possible compliance outcome’.64 What constitutes an acceptable compliance
solution to a dispute is thus a matter of negotiation.65
The very ﬁrst dispute ever brought to the WTO neatly illustrates the variety
of potential consensual outcomes. It involved a complaint by Singapore over
Malaysia’s prohibition of imports of polyethylene and polypropylene.66 Follow-
ing consultations and before the establishment of a panel, Malaysia changed its
import regulation on the two substances.67 As a result, Singapore withdrew its
62 Appellate Body Report, European Communities –Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador (EC–Bananas III
(Article 21.5 –Ecuador II)), WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, 11 December 2008, para. 222.
63 Robert E. Hudec (1993), Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT
Legal System, Salem, NH: Butterworth Legal Publishers, p. 276.
64 Amelia Porges, ‘Settling WTO Disputes’, n. 30, at 146. See also Appellate Body Report, EC–
Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador II), supra n. 62, para. 212. However, some panels or the Appellate
Body may examine possible compliance paths by ways of an obiter dictum.
65Of course, if no solution can be found, parties can resort to implementation proceedings under DSU
Article 21.5 and/or arbitration under DSU Article 25.
66 Request for Consultations under Article XXIII.1 of the GATT 1994 by Singapore, Malaysia –
Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and Polypropylene, WT/DS1/1, 13 January 1995.
67 Communication from Malaysia, Malaysia – Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene and
Polypropylene, WT/DS1/3, 31 March 1995.
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complaint. In the relevant DSB meeting, ‘Malaysia appreciated the cooperative
spirit and understanding of Singapore’s delegation in coming to an amicable
solution on this matter.’68 The withdrawal was clearly the outcome of negotiations,
but a MAS was never notiﬁed pursuant to DSU Article 3.6. So the questions arises
what, if anything, differentiates MAS from other consensual outcomes of a dispute,
e.g. a withdrawal.
Additional consensual elements in the DSU further blur the distinction between
MAS and other forms of negotiated agreements. For instance, disputing members
can agree in accordance with DSU Article 21.3(b) to determine the length of the
‘reasonable period of time’ allowed for complying with a DSB ruling. In the dispute
Mexico–Telecoms, the Panel found that certain Mexican telecommunications mea-
sures were inconsistent with the country’s GATS commitments.69 Subsequently,
Mexico and the US reached an Article 21.3(b) agreement. In the agreement, both
countries ﬁxed the ‘reasonable period of time’ at 13 months, but, in addition, set
out speciﬁc compliance steps as part of a ‘mutually agreed solution of the dis-
pute’.70 Following the elapse of the ‘reasonable period of time’, the US expressed its
satisfaction with Mexico’s compliance measures.71 However, no mutually agreed
solution was notiﬁed under DSU Article 3.6. So how can we identify MAS looking
beyond subjective labels chosen by the notifying parties, but also without unduly
conﬂating settlements with other consensual elements of the DSU, such as mere
compliance negotiations or Article 21.3(b) agreements, which are, in principle,
functionally very different from MAS?
The appropriate benchmark, against which the text of a negotiated agreement
must be evaluated to objectively determine the existence of a MAS, lies in the
substantive and the procedural speciﬁcities of MAS. Even in a hybrid system,
amicable settlements are a procedural alternative to third-party dispute resolution.
They are available throughout the stages of the DSU to pre-empt a panel report or
to avoid compliance proceedings, arbitration, or retaliation. This makes MAS
distinct from negotiations that take place as a result of third-party adjudication on
how to bring a measure into compliance. At the same time, MAS, in principle, are
substantively different from Article 21.3(b) agreements. Instead of ﬁxing delays in
compliance, MAS seek to provide a ‘solution’ to a dispute. Taken together, a MAS
can be deﬁned as a voluntary agreement pre-empting an adjudicatory ruling or
retaliation by providing a substantive solution to a WTO dispute. In light of this
68Minutes of the DSB Meeting on 19 July 1995, WT/DSB/M/6.
69 Panel Report, Mexico –Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R, 1 June
2004.
70Notiﬁcation of an Agreement, Mexico –Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/
DS204/7, 2 June 2004.
71Minutes of the DSB Meeting on 31 August 2005, held in the Centre William Rappard, WT/DSB/M/
196.
Amicable Settlements of WTO Disputes 83
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745613000165
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:43:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
objective approach, at least some of the withdrawals like Malaysia–Polyethylene
and Polypropylene and some Article 21.3(b) agreements like Mexico–Telecoms
should also be considered as MAS.72
5.2 The ‘solution’-problem: interim v. ﬁnal settlements
The proposed deﬁnition, however, leads to a second problem: what is a ‘solution’
to aWTO dispute? Is it enough to agree on steps to resolve a dispute to have aMAS
or can we only speak of a MAS once there is agreement that these compliance steps
have been taken? In other words, does aMAS propose a ‘solution’ or does it declare
a dispute resolved? The Panel and Appellate Body in EC–Bananas III (Article
21.5 – Ecuador), several years prior and unrelated to the ﬁnal settlement reached in
2012, struggled with this exact question. The EC had notiﬁed a 2001 agreement
known as the ‘Bananas Understanding’ asMAS in accordance with DSU Article 3.6
as a ‘solution’ to its dispute with Ecuador.73 In contrast, Ecuador, in its own
communication to the DSB, made clear that it did not consider the Understanding
to be a MAS, stating that the agreement rather sets out implementation steps that
‘can contribute to an overall, deﬁnite and universally accepted solution’ once fully
executed.74 The Panel took the view that an agreement had to provide ‘a positive
solution and effective settlement to the dispute’75 in order to qualify as MAS and
that the opposing notiﬁcation statements weighed against the existence of such a
‘positive solution’. Although the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel’s reliance
on the conﬂicting notiﬁcations and instead endorsed an objective approach, as
outlined above, based on the agreement’s text itself, it also stated that the ‘mere
identiﬁcation of the means will not resolve the dispute’.76 The Bananas Under-
standing could thus only be ‘a precursor to the possible conclusion of a ﬁnal
settlement agreement’.77 Hence, according to both the Panel and the Appellate
Body, outlining negotiated implementation steps as part of an interim-settlement is
not enough. To qualify as MAS, an agreement has to amount to a ‘ﬁnal settlement
agreement’. WTO panels thus need to determine on a case-by-case basis whether it
was the parties’ intention, objectively manifested in the agreement they concluded,
to have their dispute considered resolved for an agreement to qualify as MAS.
Elements such as conditional language, expressions of expectation, or pledges of
72 Although following the distinction made under section 5.2, theMexico–Telecom agreement may be
more accurately described as interim-settlement.
73Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities –Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/58, 2 July 2001.
74 Understanding on Bananas between Ecuador and the EC, European Communities –Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/60, 9 July 2001, 1. It reads: ‘it must be clear that
the provisions of Article 3.6 of the DSU are not applicable in this case’.
75 Panel Report, EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador), supra n. 14, para. 7.107.
76 Appellate Body Report, EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador II)), supra n. 62, para. 219.
77 Ibid., para. 214.
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future MAS notiﬁcation point to the intention to conclude an interim-settlement
instead of a ﬁnal settlement agreement.78
The distinction between ﬁnal settlements qualifying as MAS and interim-
settlements stands in contrast to WTO practice as WTO members have notiﬁed
both types of agreements as MAS under Article 3.6. In Japan–Sound Recordings,
the parties declared a solution only after an amendment was made to the Japanese
copyright law.79 In contrast, a MAS between Argentina and the US over the
former’s patent law was already notiﬁed before and subject to subsequent domestic
implementation.80 The Panel and the Appellate Body, however, are correct in
making a distinction between interim-settlements proposing to solve a dispute and
ﬁnal settlements declaring a dispute resolved. An agreement in which both parties
assert their understanding that a dispute is resolved should have a different legal
effect and follow-up mechanism than a document which merely sets out com-
pliance steps requiring further implementation. Unfortunately, the DSU, as it
stands today, only addresses the former (through MAS) but not the latter.
It is this gap in the DSU that WTO members are reacting to by their emerging
practice of concluding MoUs and sui generis settlements.81 Before committing to a
ﬁnal settlement through MAS, these agreements allow members to work towards
the solution of a dispute. In principle, these interim-settlements are thus meant to
bridge a legal gap and to complement rather than to substitute MAS. This is
evidenced by the fact that MoUs and sui generis settlements always foresee future
MAS notiﬁcation as ﬁnal settlement. What makes their relationship problematic in
practice, however, is that past MoUs or sui generis agreements have not always
been followed by a ﬁnal settlement and subsequent Article 3.6 MAS notiﬁcation.82
78 See also ibid., paras. 217–220. To clarify, also MAS understood as ﬁnal settlements may require
future implementation action, e.g. by complying with an agreed yearly reduction of tariffs. This alone does
not make it an interim-settlement. What counts is whether the parties’ intention, objectively manifested in
the agreement, suggests a ﬁnal settlement agreement (MAS) or merely the roadmap towards such an
agreement (interim-settlement).
79Notiﬁcation of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Japan –Measures concerning Sound Recordings, WT/
DS42/4, 17 November 1997.
80Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Conditions Set Forth in the Agreement,
Argentina – Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals,
WT/DS171/3, and Argentina –Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test Data, WT/DS196/
4, 20 June 2002.
81 Another reason why members conclude MoUs may be the inherent informality associated with these
instruments. In the context of general international law, Aust submits that states conclude MoU as mere
‘diplomatic assurances’ which, unlike international treaties, do not create legally binding rights and
obligations. See Anthony Aust (2007), Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd edn. Cambridge University
Press. In the WTO context, this argument has less weight, as MAS are not per se legally enforceable (see
section 6). The only major substantive difference between MoUs and MAS is the former’s explicit interim-
settlement nature.
82One instance in which a MoU was followed by a MAS is the case Joint Communication from China
and the United States, China –Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/7, 16 July 2004 and
Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS309/8, 6 October 2005.
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Hence, disputes risk remaining formally ‘pending’ indeﬁnitely, while it is unknown
to all but the parties involved whether the agreed compliance steps have actually
been taken. As a result, due to a lack of formality and follow-up this new practice
currently seems to be undermining rather than complementing the role of MAS in
the WTO.
5.3 Conclusion: the need for a two-step settlement procedure
Grounded in both the wording of the DSU and Appellate Body jurisprudence, it has
been shown that the existence of a MAS needs to be determined objectively as a
voluntary agreement pre-empting an adjudicatory ruling or retaliation by pro-
viding a ﬁnal solution to a WTO dispute. To arrive at such a ﬁnal settlement, WTO
members increasingly conclude informal interim-settlements not addressed by the
DSU. Negotiators should close this gap in the DSU by introducing and regulating
the separate category of interim-settlements explicitly. Amicable settlements of
WTO disputes could thus be streamlined as a two-step procedure as was de facto
done in the recent EC–Bananas settlement. First, in 2009 the ‘Geneva Agreement
on Bananas’ was concluded as an interim-settlement,83 then, in 2012, upon
scrutiny by the WTO membership as well as the interested public, ratiﬁcation and
domestic implementation, a MAS was notiﬁed as ﬁnal settlement.84 Unfortunately,
the degree of transparency and follow-up achieved by the high-proﬁle nature of the
Bananas dispute is absent in less well-publicized cases. Hence, for all disputes to
beneﬁt from an equally streamlined two-step procedure, the DSU has to be
amended. First, interim-settlements should be governed by the same notiﬁcation
and commentating procedure as MAS in Article 3.6. In addition, they should be
subject to continuous progress reporting in order to facilitate their implementation.
Second, once an interim-settlement is implemented, the parties are required to
notify the ﬁnal settlement as MAS (see section 7 for drafting suggestion). Such a
two-step procedure fully accommodates the competing bilateral and multilateral
interests in settlements: it allows the disputing parties to work towards a ﬁnal
settlement in a structured and transparent manner, alleviates power asymmetries by
placing interim-settlement negotiations into the ‘shadow of the law’, and, ﬁnally,
safeguards collective interests by bringing otherwise informal negotiations into the
ofﬁcial DSU process where it can be subject to full scrutiny.
6. The procedural and substantive law of MAS in DSU Articles 3.5–7
Having identiﬁed the agreements that are considered as MAS and that trigger the
obligations of Articles 3.5–7, we can ﬁnally turn to how the DSU balances the
83 Communication from Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, European Union, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Geneva
Agreement on Bananas, WT/L/784, 15 December 2009.
84Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, EC–Bananas, supra n. 2.
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competing bilateral and multilateral interests involved in settlements. This section
sheds light on the mechanisms and the success of this balancing framework which
facilitates, constrains, and regulates amicable settlements in the multilateral trading
system.
6.1 The procedural law of MAS
Disputants I: legal effects of MAS
When opting for a settlement instead of adjudication, disputants have an interest in
enforcing the terms of a MAS and to prevent the other party from reneging on its
MAS commitments. Yet, MAS display important differences compared to the
status and effect of the alternative DSU remedy of adjudication, which need to be
borne in mind. Unchallenged panel reports and Appellate Body ﬁndings arguably
have the status of a res judicata.85 A member may hence not raise a claim relating to
the same matter, parties, and cause of action twice. In other words, adjudication
conclusively determines the (il)legality of an allegedly WTO inconsistent measure.
The impact of a MAS on a dispute is less clear as the DSU is silent on the legal effect
of MAS and the possibility of their enforcement.86 Can a member hence challenge a
measure after having settled a dispute over that same measure in a MAS? Guidance
can be found in case law. The Panel in India–Autos was faced with that question.
India argued that a MAS concluded with the EC over the prior dispute India–
Quantitative Restrictions87 precluded the EC from bringing a new challenge.
Remarking that the DSU is silent on the impact of MAS on subsequent proceed-
ings,88 the Panel faced a dilemma between preserving members’ right to a panel and
giving effect to a MAS as ‘clearly to be preferred’ DSU remedy.89 The Panel solved
the problem by noting that this question has to be answered on a case-by-case basis
and that, in the present dispute, the terms of the earlier MAS did not cover the
speciﬁc issues raised in the newer dispute.90 Finally, the Panel stressed that this
85Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, and Petros Mavroidis (2006), The World Trade
Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 84–85. The Panel in
India–Autos dealt with the question of a possible application of the principle in WTO law. While it found
that its conditions had not been met in the speciﬁc case, the Panel was sympathetic to the possible existence
of a res judicata effect in WTO law. However, it refrained from explicitly deciding this systemic issue. See
Panel Report, India –Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India–Autos), WT/DS146/R,WT/DS175/
R, 21 December 2001, paras. 7.54–7.103.
86 Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘Mutually Agreed Solutions’, supra n. 4, at 348.
87Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, India–Quantitative Restrictions, supra n. 24.
88 Panel Report, India–Autos, supra n. 85, para. 7.113.
89 Ibid., para. 7.115: ‘Without clear guidance in the DSU, this question raises an important systemic
issue. On the one hand, the Panel recognizes that the right for any WTOMember to bring a dispute to the
DSB is one of the fundamental tenets of the DSU, and that it could not be lightly assumed in what particular
circumstances the drafters of the DSU might have intended such right to be foregone. On the other hand, it
may also be the case that it could not be lightly assumed that those drafters intended mutually agreed
solutions, expressly promoted by the DSU, to have no meaningful legal effect in subsequent proceedings.’
90 Ibid., paras. 7.115–7.132.
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ﬁnding is without prejudice to the general legal question ‘whether a notiﬁed
mutually agreed solution can ever operate as a bar to a panel’s express mandate
from the DSB’.91
A similar strategy was adopted by the later Panel EC–Bananas III (Article
21.5 – Ecuador), already discussed above, which had to decide whether a MAS, the
Bananas Understanding, concluded during the implementation stage, could pre-
clude a claimant from requesting compliance proceedings under DSU Article 21.5.
While the Panel indicated that it would follow the India–Autos approach of a case-
speciﬁc analysis,92 it stated in a more general way that ‘the Bananas Understanding
can legally bar Ecuador from bringing this compliance challenge only if that
Understanding constitutes a positive solution and effective settlement to the dispute
in question’.93 The Panel went on to apply this ‘positive and effective solution’ test
to the Bananas Understanding. It addressed the substantive obligations underlying
a MAS and concluded that the ‘complainant must have the possibility of having
recourse to WTO dispute settlement in order to review the conformity with the
covered agreements of a measure purportedly taken by the respondent to imple-
ment a step set out in an alleged mutually agreed solution or other legally binding
agreement’.94 On appeal, the Appellate Body overturned the Panel’s reasoning and
stressed the ﬂexibility and contractual freedom of the parties. Whether a MAS
constitutes a ‘positive and effective solution’ to a dispute has no bearing on whether
or not a complainant has access to 21.5 proceedings. The question is rather
whether the terms of a MAS indicate ‘the agreement between the parties of a
relinquishment of the right to have recourse to Article 21.5’.95 The Appellate Body
thus refrained from attributing to MAS the effect of precluding further proceedings
per se and, instead, stressed the contractual freedom of the disputants in a MAS. In
consequence, the legal effect of a MAS has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis in
light of the actual terms of the agreement.
Disputants II: enforcement
Another important difference in settlements compared to WTO adjudication
relates to the enforcement of MAS. A panel or Appellate Body decision, once
adopted by the DSB, entails a commitment on the part of the respondent state to
bring a measure, found to be inconsistent with the WTO agreements, into con-
formity. Once such a decision is rendered, the DSU provides for a detailed follow-
up mechanism. A complainant unsatisﬁed with the respondent’s compliance can
request the establishment of a DSU Article 21.5 compliance panel. If the respondent
91 Ibid., para. 7.134.
92 Panel Report, EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador), supra n. 14, para. 7.59.
93 Ibid., para. 7.75.
94 Ibid., para. 7.91.
95 Appellate Body Report, EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador II), supra 62, para. 212.
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fails to comply, the complainant can request retaliation rights pursuant to DSU
Article 22.
No such follow-up mechanism exists with respect to MAS. According to the
conventional view, parties cannot, in principle, enforce the provisions of a
settlement through WTO panels. DSU Article 1.1 makes clear that the jurisdiction
of panels is limited to the WTO covered agreements and MAS are not part
thereof.96
In an article published in 2011 in this journal, Alvarez-Jiménez presents an
alternative view. Reacting to the 2006 Softwood Lumber settlement of several
WTO disputes between Canada and the United States which provided for a self-
standing commercial arbitration mechanism to solve MAS-related disputes,
Alvarez-Jiménez argues that WTO panels should and can assume jurisdiction
over MAS-related controversies. He demonstrates in a detailed legal analysis that
the jurisdiction of panels over MAS can be grounded in DSU Article 3.3 read
together with Article 3.7, since a MAS creates rights and obligations accruing
indirectly out of the DSU – a WTO agreement.97 He also shows that MAS are
applicable law under the DSU and explores various procedural implications of
having MAS litigated at the WTO.98
There are, however, a number of legal and judicial policy considerations that
militate against his argument. First, it is doubtful whether a panel or the Appellate
Body would follow Alvarez-Jiménez’s reading of the DSU, since Article 3.3 merely
provides contextual language, whereas DSU Article 1.1, in which the word
‘indirectly’ is absent, sets out the jurisdictional scope of the WTO dispute settle-
ment. Second, the Appellate Body as outlined above has so far stressed the con-
tractual freedom of the parties to a MAS and declined to attribute any automatic
legal effects to these agreements. Already today, WTO members can provide for an
independent enforcement mechanism in their MAS, if they wish to do so. As Shoyer
suggests, WTO members can even foresee WTO-based arbitration pursuant to
DSU Article 25 in their MAS, which would then be subject to the DSU’s follow-up
mechanism in Articles 21 and 22.99 Opting for an automatic enforcement of MAS
would be a reversal of the existing approach in case law and would frustrate the
intention of those parties to a MAS that purposefully refrained from including any
enforcement mechanism in their agreement under the legal expectation that their
contractual choices would be observed. Third, Alvarez-Jiménez points to the
Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA), as one of the examples when WTO members
96 Burnier da Silveira et al., ‘Die Bedeutung der konsensualen Elemente’, supra n. 17, at 49.
97 Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘Mutually Agreed Solutions’, supra n. 4, at 353–357.
98 Ibid., at 360–362. Also other authors have suggested that MAS could be applicable law before a
WTO Panel, see Laurent Bartel (2001), ‘Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’, Journal
of World Trade, 35(4): 499–519.
99 Andrew W. Shoyer (1998), ‘The First Three Years of WTO Dispute Settlement: Observations and
Suggestions’, Journal of International Economic Law, 1(2): 277–302, at 289.
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made use of their contractual ﬂexibility to set-up an independent enforcement
mechanism, to demonstrate the need for an automatic WTO-based MAS enforce-
ment. In fact, the SLA points to the opposite conclusion. The SLA did not only solve
a number of WTO disputes but settled 20 national, NAFTA, and WTO litigations.
In such a multi-level and multi-jurisdictional context, a ‘customized interstate
arbitration vehicle’ is in a much better position than a WTO panel to manage issue-
speciﬁc, cross-jurisdictional disputes and to bring some order into the ‘spaghetti
bowl’ of overlapping trade agreements. Forth, the rise of interim-settlements and
decline of MAS shifts disputes over implementation to MoUs and sui generis
settlements. As interim-settlements, these agreements would not beneﬁt from the
automatic enforceability of MAS. Integrating these agreements in a structured and
transparent two-step settlement procedure as proposed above would also help
address disputes over their implementation. Finally, MAS enforceability is cur-
rently one of the controversial issues discussed in the on-going DSU reform debate
(see section 7). So even if there were a genuine need for automatic enforcement, the
Appellate Body would be wise to leave such a controversial topic to the WTO
membership rather than to pre-empt the outcome of negotiations.
Collective stakeholders I: notiﬁcation as procedural safeguard
The notiﬁcation requirement of MAS in DSU Article 3.6100 serves to harmonize
instant dispute resolution with collective stakes. As discussed above, conﬁdentiality
and privacy are needed to facilitate MAS, but they come at the expense of pro-
cedural transparency. The DSU resolves this dilemma by recognizing and maintain-
ing procedural conﬁdentiality during negotiations but introducing ex ante and
ex post transparency through notiﬁcation. Ex ante, WTO consultation requests
are notiﬁed and hence made known to other members and the interested public
pursuant to DSU Article 4.4. In addition, DSU Article 4.11 allows WTO members
with a ‘substantial trade interest’ to join the consultation.101 Busch and Reinhardt,
however, ﬁnd that the inclusion of third parties in the consultation phase sig-
niﬁcantly decreases the odds of a settlement.102 If a MAS is reached, it must be
notiﬁed ex post to the DSB and other relevant WTO bodies ‘where any member
may raise any point relating thereto’ as stipulated in DSU Article 3.6. Hence, as
Baroncini puts it:
the diplomatic nature of the conclusion of a WTO dispute by no means entails
that the amicable settlement may be considered as a private business between the
100DSU Article 3.6: ‘Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall be notiﬁed to the DSB and the relevant
Councils and Committees, where any Member may raise any point relating thereto.’
101 To demonstrate a ‘substantial trade interests’, it is generally enough to claim ‘systemic interests’ in
the dispute. The defendant may object the inclusion, in which case the third party may issue its own
consultation request. See Busch and Reinhardt, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law’, supra n. 32, 76.
102 Ibid.
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parties involved in the controversy but, on the contrary, is seen – in the same way
as it happens for third party binding decisions – as an act of general interest with
reference to which the WTO system guarantees a right of immediate knowledge
and comment.103
The DSU is silent, however, on how exactly MAS’ ex post notiﬁcation in DSU
Article 3.6 is to be done. Particularly, it is unclear who has to notify, how detailed
notiﬁcation has to be, and when it has to be made. In practice, this ambiguity has
created considerable problems. Although conﬂicting notiﬁcation such as in the
above mentioned case of the Bananas Understanding are rare and the majority of
MAS are notiﬁed by both parties,104 the Bananas dispute demonstrates that DSU
Article 3.6 would beneﬁt from further clariﬁcation as to whether both parties are
under an obligation to notify. Similarly, the notiﬁcation practice is highly divergent
when it comes to detail and timing. The arguably most extreme case involves a dis-
pute between Hungary and Croatia over the latter’s SPS import measure allegedly
adopted to prevent the spread of BSE. Hungary ﬁled a consultation request in July
2003. Almost six years later, in February 2009, both countries notiﬁed the DSB
that a MAS had already been reached in 2003. The communication’s part relevant
to the MAS is limited to the sentence: ‘On behalf of our authorities we would like to
inform you that Hungary and Croatia did ﬁnd a mutually satisfactory solution to
this case in 2003.’105 No further detail was provided. Baroncini concluded in her
1998 research on MAS that a notiﬁcation that lacks detail and is not promptly
made fails to function as means to safeguard third parties’ stakes.106 This can only
be reiterated in light of such more recent practice.
Notiﬁcation, if properly done, can be a procedural safeguard for the collective
interests involved in MAS. First, domestic stakeholders learn about the terms of the
settlement and can scrutinize their government’s decision based on this infor-
mation. Second, DSU Article 3.6 ‘ensure[s] that all WTO Members may review
mutually agreed solutions for consistency with WTO obligations’.107 In other
words, notiﬁcation allows third WTO members to monitor whether a settlement
was made at their expense and potentially claim MFN beneﬁts arising out of the
settlement. In contrast to direct participation of third countries in consultations,
such ex post notiﬁcation of MAS does not diminish the likelihood of a MAS being
reached.108 Third, notiﬁcation is also crucial for the WTO system at large as a
103 Baroncini, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding’, supra n. 4, 243.
104 Panel Report, EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador), supra n. 14, para. 7.105.
105Request for Consultations by Hungary –Addendum, Croatia –Measure Affecting Imports of Live
Animals and Meat Products (WT/DS297/2), 2 February 2009.
106 Baroncini (1999), The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding’, supra n. 4, at 259. In particular,
this precludes third members from monitoring the consistency of settlements.
107 Background Note by the Secretariat, Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solutions under Article 3.6
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, WT/DSB/W/35, 7 August 1996.
108 Busch and Reinhardt, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law’, supra 32.
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properly notiﬁed MAS could produce valuable guidance on ways in which
contentious and long-standing WTO disputes can be solved amicably.109
Collective Stakeholders II: challenging a MAS
DSU Article 3.6 provides a second control mechanism according to which ‘any
member may raise any point relating’ to MAS in the relevant WTO bodies. The
term ‘any point’ may refer to further clariﬁcation requests, but also to objections
against elements in a MAS that undermine third party rights.110 While Article 3.6
provides for a purely diplomatic mechanism to check and potentially challenge the
WTO consistency of MAS, a WTO member also has the possibility to lodge a
formal request for consultation against one of the parties to a settlement on the
grounds that a measure enacted pursuant to a MAS nulliﬁes or impairs beneﬁts
accruing to it under the WTO agreements.111 However, a more direct surveillance
mechanism to systematically verify the consistency of MAS with WTO law is
missing in the DSU.
6.2 The substantive law of MAS
While, in principle, MAS offer greater ﬂexibility to disputants than panel
adjudication, the DSU also places limits on the contractual freedom of the
disputants and includes substantive requirements to harmonize a MAS with the
interests of other stakeholders.
DSU Article 3.6 conﬁnes MAS to ‘matters formally raised under the consultation
and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements’. Hence, only disputes
subject to a request for consultation pursuant to DSU Article 4.4 can be settled in a
MAS.112 Furthermore, Shanker interprets this provision to limit the content of a
MAS to the precise issues raised in the consultation request.113 This would limit the
ability of WTO members to conclude ‘WTO+ ’ MAS encompassing additional
issues and side-payments. However, the object and purpose of DSU Article 3.6 is to
set out the notiﬁcation requirement of settlements toWTO disputes and not to limit
the substantive contents of these settlements.114 Therefore, disputants can include
issues in their MAS that were not speciﬁed in the request for consultation as long as
109 In that vein, Baroncini argues that MAS deserve as much attention as panel or Appellate Body
reports. See Baroncini, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding’, supra n. 4, at 244.
110 For greater details and examples, see ibid., at 261–263.
111 It must be stressed that the success of such a request may nevertheless be closely linked to the
notiﬁcation of a MAS. Under the DSU, the burden of proof is on the complainant to show a breach of the
covered agreements, which is then presumed to constitute a prima facie case of nulliﬁcation or impairment
pursuant to DSU Article 3.8. Hence, the complaining member has to gather enough evidence to mount such
a prima facie case, which may be more difﬁcult if the notiﬁcation is incomplete or not detailed enough.
112Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘Mutually Agreed Solutions’, supra n. 4, at 347–348.
113 Shanker, ‘Argentina–US Mutually Agreed Solution’, supra n. 33, at 568.
114 Background Note by the Secretariat, supra n. 107.
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they form part of a ‘package deal’ that provides a ﬁnal settlement to the ‘matters
formally raised’ by the complainant.
Other parts of the DSU, however, do regulate the content of MAS. DSU
Article 3.5115 is an umbrella provision that deals with ‘all solutions to matters
formally raised’ before the WTO. This includes arbitration awards as speciﬁcally
mentioned, but alsoMAS as well as outcomes reached following panel or Appellate
Body reports. In order to be a valid ‘solution’, MAS have to meet three criteria: they
have to ‘[1] be consistent with those agreements and [2] shall not nullify or impair
beneﬁts accruing to any Member under those agreements, [3] nor impede the
attainment of any objective of those agreements’. Together with Article 3.7 that
reiterates the requirement of consistency for MAS, these three criteria embody the
substantive balancing considerations in the DSU limiting the contractual freedom
of the disputants with respect to settlements and safeguarding the interests of other
stakeholders. An agreement that fails to meet these criteria cannot amount to a
‘solution’ within the meaning of these provisions. So even though a settlement may
provide a ‘ﬁnal solution’ for the disputing parties, as objectively determined on the
basis of the text of the agreement, and thus qualify as MAS (see section 5), non-
compliance with DSU Article 3.5 and 3.7 will render such a MAS null and void in
its entirety for the sake of protecting collective interests.116 Let us now discuss these
requirements from the different balancing angles beginning with the contractual
freedom of disputants.
Disputants: contractual freedom to conclude ‘WTO–’/‘WTO+ ’ settlements?
The DSU categorically mandates MAS to be ‘consistent with’ the covered agree-
ments. The Appellate Body clariﬁed a similarly worded term in Article 5.1 of
China’s Accession Protocol ‘[w]ithout prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade in
a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement’ in the case China–Audiovisuals.117
115DSU Article 3.5: ‘All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute
settlement provisions of the covered agreements, including arbitration awards, shall be consistent with
those agreements and shall not nullify or impair beneﬁts accruing to any Member under those agreements,
nor impede the attainment of any objective of those agreements.’ The same requirement of consistency is
repeated in DSU Article 3.7.
116Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘Mutually Agreed Solutions’, supra n. 4, at 352 suggests that a partial
inconsistency of a MAS may not led to its invalidity. However, the text of DSU Article 3.5 makes clear
that only WTO compliant outcomes can constitute a ‘solution’. Allowing partially inconsistent MAS
because they may contain ‘other clauses . . . effective to resolve the dispute’would disregard the effet utile of
the provision that aims to protect collective interests in settlements by expressly limiting the contractual
freedom of the disputants. This reading also ﬁnds support in the general WTO practice of leaving it to
members, and not to panels or the Appellate Body, to decide on how to bring a WTO-inconsistent legal
instrument back into WTO conformity. MAS contracting parties are perfectly free to adjust the terms of
their agreement to beneﬁt from DSU Articles 3.5 and 3.7.
117Appellate Body Report, China –Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, 21 December 2009
(emphasis added).
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The Appellate Body stated that ‘WTO Members’ regulatory requirements may be
WTO consistent in one of two ways. First, they may simply not contravene any
WTO obligation. Second, even if they contravene a WTO obligation, they may be
justiﬁed under an applicable exception’.118 Applied to the MAS context, this means
that to be WTO-consistent settlements must conform with all WTO obligations,
but can also beneﬁt from the ﬂexibilities granted by the covered agreements, e.g.
their exceptions. Conversely, it can also be inferred from the passage that MAS that
are acting against a WTO obligation and do not beneﬁt from an exception are
‘inconsistent with’ the covered agreements. Therefore, a MAS that contracts out of
a WTO obligation without being justiﬁed by the covered agreements themselves
would be inconsistent with DSU Articles 3.5 and 3.7.
MAS can thus not diminish WTO obligations. But can they diminish rights
granted by the WTO agreements and still be consistent with the covered
agreements? For instance, is the already mentioned MAS practice of waiving a
right to further DSU recourse inconsistent with Article 3.5? Diminishing rights
could conﬂict with the second requirement of DSU Article 3.5 mandating that MAS
‘shall not nullify or impair beneﬁts accruing to any Member under those
agreements’. The term ‘any member’ includes the disputants. As the Panel in EC–
Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador) pointed out: ‘it is ﬁrst and foremost the
beneﬁts accruing to the complainant in the dispute that might be affected [by a
MAS]’.119
The non-exercise or waiving of rights does not conﬂict with DSU Article 3.5 for a
number of reasons. In public international law, it is generally accepted that states
can waive rights and claims as long as the exercise of their international obligations
remains unaffected.120 WTO law mirrors general international law in this respect.
The Appellate Body stated in EC–Poultry with respect to the ordinary meaning of
the word ‘concession’ that ‘a Member may yield or waive some of its own rights
and grant beneﬁts to other Members, but that it cannot unilaterally diminish its
own obligations’.121 Hence, members cannot diminish their own obligations, but
they can waive or choose not to exercise their own rights.
A speciﬁc outgrowth of the general principle of waiving rights is found in the ILC
Articles on State Responsibility Article 45, which states that an injured state may
not invoke the responsibility of another state if, previously, it has validly waived its
right of standing. The freedom of states to waive a right of standing is also
recognized inWTO law. This links back to the discussion in the previous section on
118 Ibid., para. 223.
119 Panel Report, EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador), supra n. 14, para. 7.106.
120Waivers are recognized as unilateral acts that can bind states internationally, see Krzysztof
Skubiszewski (1991), ‘Unilateral Acts of State’, in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed.), International Law
Achievements and Prospects, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 221–240.
121Appellate Body Report, European Communities –Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain
Poultry Products, WT/DS69/AB/R, 13 July 1998, para. 98.
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the EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador) case and the emphasis placed by the
Appellate Body on the terms of a MAS when evaluating their effects. While
rejecting that a MAS per se ‘necessarily implies that parties waive their rights to
have recourse to the dispute settlement system’,122 the Appellate Body acknowl-
edged the contractual freedom of the disputants by stating that ‘a mutually agreed
solution pursuant to Article 3.7 may encompass an agreement to forego the right to
initiate compliance proceedings’.123 Such agreement, however, must be clearly
indicated.124 If this is the case, the waiver of standing in a MAS could constitute a
‘legal impediment to the exercise of a panel’s jurisdiction’.125 Such a legal
impediment is different from a legal effect equivalent to res judicata rejected above
and relates instead to the individual member’s right of standing that is waived. The
respondent can thus use a MAS as a defence before a WTO panel to prevent the
claimant from exercising a right that has explicitly been waived in a MAS.
Waiving of a procedural right of standing can also have a comparable effect to an
explicit contracting-out of obligations. If two members agree not to challenge a
measure in violation of a WTO obligation, they tacitly accept that violation. Such
arrangements may be particularly likely in disputes involving de facto counter
claims.126 For instance, in a dispute over Brazil’s patent law and its compulsory
licensing system on antiviral drugs,127 the US accepted a settlement establishing a
bilateral dialog and leaving the challenged measure intact, once Brazil came forth
with its own claim128 against provisions of the US Patent Code.129 In the letter
exchange notiﬁed as a MAS, the US Trade Representative wrote: ‘In addition, we
would expect Brazil not to proceed with further dispute settlement action regarding
sections 204 and 209 of the U.S. patent law.’130 While this understanding may not
amount to a binding or formal waiver, it demonstrates how a MAS can be used to
tacitly agree on a non-exercise of rights amounting de facto to the acceptance of a
violation.131
122Appellate Body Report, EC–Bananas III (Article 21.5 –Ecuador II), supra n. 62, para. 212.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125Appellate Body Report,Mexico –Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/
AB/R, 6 March 2006.
126DSU Article 3.10 limits the use of counter claims. The term is used here to describe parallel
proceedings in which two WTO members challenge each other on similar grounds.
127Brazil –Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199.
128United States – Patent Code, WT/DS244.
129Viviana Muños Tellez (2010), ‘Dispute Settlement under the TRIPS Agreement: The United States–
Brazil (2000) and United States–Argentina (2002) Patent Disputes’, in Carlos M. Correa (ed.), Research
Handbook on the Interpretation and Enforcement of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 215–236, at 223.
130Notiﬁcation of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil –Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/
DS199/4, 19 July 2001.
131Other WTO members outside the MAS remain of course free to bring a claim.
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Beyond the waiving of standing, the WTO also more generally recognizes the
possibility of waiving procedural rights. In Canada–Continued Suspension, for
example the parties ‘waived their right to conﬁdentiality and requested open
hearings’.132 Furthermore, members are also free to take on new trade-related
obligations that limit rights and ﬂexibilities granted under the WTO covered
agreements, such as ‘TRIPS+ ’, ‘TRIMS+ ’ or generally ‘WTO+ ’ commitments, in a
MAS.133 This may amount to a de factowaiver of substantive rights. In conclusion,
members may voluntarily waive rights or forego beneﬁts accruing to them under
the covered agreements in a MAS without violating DSU Article 3.5. It also follows
that a member can use a MAS as defence before a WTO panel to prevent the
exercise by another member of rights that have been validly waived in a MAS.
Collective stakeholders: substantive safeguards
DSU Article 3.5, especially in its second and third requirement, is also directed
towards safeguarding the interests of other stakeholders. The second requirement
stipulates that MAS may not nullify or impair beneﬁts accruing to third WTO
members. Not only does this provision make clear that MAS cannot be achieved at
the expense of other states, but also that MAS cannot be used to prevent members
from enjoying the beneﬁts accruing to them under the covered agreements. Bilateral
concessions granted in MAS, therefore, have to be multilateralized by virtue of the
MFN obligation. Furthermore, the third requirement in DSU Article 3.5 states that
MAS shall not ‘impede the attainment of any objective of those agreements’. This
refers to the collective interests of the WTO membership at large in preventing
MAS that go against the spirit of the WTO agreements.
Guidance on the interpretation of these two requirements may be found in
general international law. Taken together, the second and third requirements in
DSU Article 3.5 mirror the conditions attached to inter se modiﬁcations of
multilateral treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
Article 41.134 Underlying the conditions in the VCLT is a distinction between two
kinds of multilateral treaties: those containing obligations that can be reduced to a
bundle of bilateral relationships and those that are collective in nature and are
owed to the treaty membership as a whole.135 Bilateral obligations in multilateral
treaties may be modiﬁed inter se without contravening the rights of other members
132 Panel Report, Canada –Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC –Hormones Dispute, WT/
DS321, 31 March 2008, para 7.49.
133 See also Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘Mutually Agreed Solutions’, supra n. 4, at 349–350.
134 The VCLT permits such modiﬁcation provided that the multilateral treaty allows it or,
alternatively, that it does not explicitly prohibit it and that two supplementary conditions are met: the
modiﬁcation ‘(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the
performance of their obligations and (ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.’
135 Joost Pauwelyn (2003), ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations
Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’, European Journal of International Law, 14(5): 907–951, at 908.
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or a treaties’ objective. Collective obligations, in contrast, relate to third party
rights and common values transcending individual parties’ interest. They can
therefore not be modiﬁed inter se without affecting the enjoyment of other
members’ rights and frustrating an agreement’s purpose.136
Applying the distinction to theWTO, Pauwelyn concludes thatWTO obligations
are essentially bilateral in nature. The object of WTO disciplines is the regulation of
trade, which is an inherently bilateral activity. Since WTO obligations can be
individualized, they are bilateral in nature and inter se modiﬁcations are
possible.137 Carmody, on the other hand, argues that these obligations are in fact
better understood as collective. He contends that the WTO does not regulate trade,
but ‘expectations concerning trade-related behavior of governments’.138 In that
case, inter se modiﬁcation would be impossible as this would violate the rights of
third parties and frustrate the objectives of the WTO agreements.
The divergent views expressed in that debate highlight how difﬁcult it is to
identify the ‘objective’ of an agreement. While it may be relatively easy to determine
whether an inter se modiﬁcation or a settlement infringes on third party rights, it is
far less clear when a MAS impedes the attainment of a WTO objective. Pauwelyn
argues that the two elements in VCLT Article 41 – the protection of third party
rights and the impediment of an agreement’s objective – are deeply intertwined.139
Indeed, also for MAS, it is difﬁcult to imagine a settlement that would be consistent
with WTO agreements and respect third party rights, meeting the ﬁrst two criteria
of DSU Article 3.5, but that still impedes an objective of the covered agreements.
Consequently, the third requirement of DSU Article 3.5 may only prove decisive in
rare circumstances in which it can function as a safety net that prevents MAS that
exceed the degree of ﬂexibility given to the disputants and risk unduly fragmenting
the multilateral trading system. Table 2 summarizes the ﬁndings of this section.
7. Amicable settlements and the DSU reform
Introduced during the Tokyo Round, MAS have fulﬁlled their primary purpose of
adding stability to the multilateral trading system by providing negotiated solutions
to hard or ‘wrong cases’. The challenge remains, however, to ﬁnd a suitable middle
ground between preserving the contractual freedom of disputants while safe-
guarding third party and collective interests. Although, as this article has shown,
the DSU is relatively successful in balancing the different stakes and stakeholders in
MAS, there is certainly room for improvement. Particularly the issues of
notiﬁcation and enforcement of MAS have featured prominently in recent efforts
136 Ibid., at 914.
137 Ibid., at 928–936.
138Chios Carmody (2006), ‘WTOObligations as Collective’, European Journal of International Law,
17(2): 419–443, at 421.
139 Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations’, supra n. 135, at 915.
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Table 2. Summary table – stakes, stakeholders and the law of MAS
Stake-holders Stakes
DSU
Procedure Substantive outcome
Disputants Flexibility MAS are possible throughout the stages of the DSU in
accordance with DSU Articles 3.7, 4.3, 11, 12.7, 15,
22.2, and 22.8.
DSU Articles 3.5 and 3.7 prohibit MAS that diminish
WTO obligations; however, disputants can waive
rights such as standing (WTO–) and add to rights and
obligations in their settlements (WTO+).Power asymmetry In the DSU’s hybrid system of negotiation and
adjudication, the right to a panel casts a ‘shadow of
the law’ over negotiations between the parties that
alleviates power asymmetries.
Conﬁdentiality and
privacy in settlements
DSU Article 4.6 mandates consultations to be
conﬁdential.
DSU Article 4.11 provides that the respondent can
object to the inclusion of third parties in the
consultations if their claim of substantial interest in
the dispute is not well-founded.
Compliance/
enforcement
Mandatory notiﬁcation increases the reputation costs
of reneging on a MAS commitment improving
compliance.
Disputants can include a separate enforcement
mechanism in their MAS, e.g. arbitration (see SLA)
including under DSU Article 25.
Disputants can challenge the original measure again
unless they have waived their right to bring such a
proceeding in their MAS.
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Domestic stakeholders,
third WTO members,
WTO system
Transparency of MAS ex ante: Requests for consultations have to be notiﬁed
in detail pursuant to DSU Article 4.4.
ex post: A MAS has to be notiﬁed to all relevant
Councils and Committees in accordance with DSU
Article 3.6.
Consultations themselves are conﬁdential in
accordance with DSU Article 4.6.
Third WTO
members
Participation in
consultation
WTO members can request to join in consultations
pursuant to DSU Article 4.11 or issue their own
request for consultation.
Challenging a
settlement
In accordance with DSU Article 3.6, members may
raise any point relating to MAS before the relevant
Councils and Committees to which the MAS was
notiﬁed.
Members may also initiate a request for consultations
over a measure adopted pursuant to a MAS.
Violation of third party
rights in settlements
Aside from the general requirement of MAS’
consistency with WTO agreements pursuant to DSU
Articles 3.5 and 3.7, Article 3.5 explicitly stipulates
that MAS ‘shall not nullify or impair beneﬁts accruing
to any Member under those agreements’.
WTO system Fragmentation or
circumvention of
WTO law
The three requirements in DSU Article 3.5 ensure that
MAS strengthen and not undermine the WTO.
MAS:
(1) have to be consistent with the covered
agreements;
(2) shall not nullify or impair beneﬁts accruing to any
Member under those agreements;
(3) shall not impede the attainment of any objective of
those agreements.
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to reform the DSU. Already in 1994, the WTOMinisterial Conference called for a
revision of the DSU until 1999140 and the Doha Ministerial Conference agreed
upon a re-negotiation of the DSU in 2001.141
As for MAS notiﬁcation, there is a consensus among the membership to reform
DSU Article 3.6. A number of different WTO members submitted proposals that
shared the desire to make notiﬁcation more detailed and to set a time limit for
notiﬁcation of 60 days.142 The 2003 negotiation text under chairman Péter Balás
reﬂected these preferences in the new Article 3.6.143 The 2011 negotiation text goes
even further and limits the notiﬁcation period to ten days after reaching a
settlement.144 Furthermore the new text clariﬁes that both parties (‘each party’)
have to notify. Hence, much progress has been made on the rules governing
notiﬁcation.
A more contentious issue in current negotiation is the enforceability of MAS.
Early on, the EC submitted a proposal to treat a failure to implement the terms of a
notiﬁed MAS as a violation of the covered agreements and to amend DSU Articles
21.5 and 22 so that a party could initiate compliance proceedings to enforce a
MAS.145 According to the EC, this would makeMAS more attractive and save time
and resources, as a complainant would not have to restart a new procedure.146
However, the proposed changes have not been introduced in the negotiation
draft. According to the recent report by the DSB Special Session Chairman
140WTOMinisterial Conference, The Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, available at: www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/53-ddsu.pdf.
141Doha Ministerial Declaration, 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 30.
142Communication from India on behalf of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, and
Malaysia,Dispute Settlement Body – Special Session –Dispute Settlement Understanding Proposals: Legal
Text, TN/DS/W/47, 11 February 2003. Proposal by Japan, Dispute Settlement Body – Special
Session –Amendment of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, TN/DS/W/32, 22 January 2003. Proposal by Japan, Dispute Settlement Body – Special
Session –Negotiations on Improvements and Clariﬁcations of the Dispute Settlement Understanding,
TN/DS/W/22, 28 October 2002. Proposals on DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe,Dispute Settlement Body – Special Session –Negotiations on the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/18, 7 October 2002.
143Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Péter Balás, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, Dispute
Settlement Body – Special Session, TN/DS/9, 6 June 2003.
144Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto, to the Trade Negotiations Committee,
Dispute Settlement Body – Special session, TN/DS/25, 21 April 2011. The new Article 3.6 reads:
‘Each party [to a mutually agreed solution] with respect to a matter raised under the dispute
settlement provisions of the covered agreements shall notify the detailed terms of such solution to the
DSB and relevant Councils and Committees. The notiﬁcation shall be made in writing and submitted
within 10 days after reaching the solution. Any Member may raise any point relating to the solution
in the DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees.’
145Communication from the European Communities, Dispute Settlement Body – Special
Session –Contribution of the European Communities and its Member States to the Improvement of the
WTO Dispute Settlement, TN/DS/W/1, 13 March 2002.
146 Ibid., 7, 8.
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Ronald Saborío Soto, disagreement still persists over that issue.147 While some
scholars have made a compelling case for such reform,148 the need for additional
enforcement capacity may be overrated (see also section 6). First, given that only in
a minority of cases non-implementation was alleged, the majority of MAS seem to
be complied with. Second, members are free to include other enforcement
mechanisms in their MAS such as arbitration pursuant to DSU Article 25. Third,
unless they waived their right of standing, members can always bring a new case
of non-compliance against the initial measure if they are unsatisﬁed with the
compliance of a MAS. Finally, the conclusion of more and more MoUs is shifting
the compliance debate to interim-settlements where more regulation and follow-up
is needed. Hence, there is little added-value in including a further enforcement
mechanism in the DSU for MAS.
However, if members decide to accept the EC’s proposal and strengthen
enforceability of MAS, they should simultaneously improve the control mech-
anisms of third parties to check MAS consistency. Instead of only letting
members ‘raise any point relating to’ MAS before the relevant WTO bodies, a
WTO Committee could be designated to monitor new MAS for WTO conformity
on its own accord. Furthermore, it could also be clariﬁed that compliance panels, as
envisaged by the EC, should not only enforce but also check a MAS for consistency
with DSU Articles 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7.149
Two issues raised in this study, however, do not currently feature on the DSU
reform agenda. First, the WTOwould beneﬁt from a more clearly deﬁned objective
concept of amicable settlements. This could take the form of a MAS deﬁnition in
the DSU. But even more limited efforts could prove fruitful. Currently, researchers
and states alike have to actively look beyond regular Article 3.6 notiﬁcations to ﬁnd
potential settlements ‘hidden’ in DSB minutes or Article 21.3(b) submissions.
Instead the WTO Secretariat in its efforts for more transparency could, in coor-
dination with the WTOmembership, compile a publicly accessible list of all known
amicable WTO settlements whether formally notiﬁed or not.
Second, the on-going DSU reform turns a blind eye to the issue of interim-
settlements which are steadily growing in numbers. Legal security and transparency
would be greatly enhanced, if the provisions of the DSU made a clear distinction
between MAS as ﬁnal settlements and interim-settlements such as MoUs intro-
ducing new disciplines on the latter. As part of a two-stage procedure, parties could
147Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Ronald Saborío Soto, supra n. 144, paras. 104–107.
148 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2002), ‘Additional Negotiation Proposals on Improvements and
Clariﬁcations of the DSU, in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed.), Preparing the Doha Development Round:
Improvements and Clariﬁcations of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, Florence: EUI/RSC,
pp. 125–139, at 131. Joost Pauwelyn (2003), ‘The Limits of Litigation: Americanization and Negotiation
in the Settlement of WTO’, Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 19(1): 121–140, at 134. Shoyer,
‘The First Three Years of WTO Dispute Settlement’, supra n. 99, at 287–290.
149 See also Pauwelyn, ‘The Limits of Litigation’, supra n. 148, at 134.
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be required to notify and report continuously on the progress made in
implementing interim-settlements until the moment that a ﬁnal MAS is reached.150
Such a regime would strengthen and streamline the settlement practice for the dis-
puting parties. At the same time, it would bring interim-settlements that currently
escape regulation into the ordinary DSU structures allowing other members and the
interested public to follow their progress towards a ﬁnal settlement more closely.
In conclusion, the DSU at it stands today is already relatively well equipped to
deal with many of the balancing considerations arising out of MAS, aligning dis-
putants’ ﬂexibility needs and ‘instant dispute’ resolution with collective stakes and
‘systemic goals’. Together with the reﬁnements already tabled and those newly
proposed in this study, the DSU can further enhance legal security and predict-
ability in the law governing MAS and foster amicable solutions that strengthen the
multilateral trading system.
150A possible DSU Article 3.6bis could read:
‘Any agreement reached with a view to conclude a mutually agreed solution shall be subject to the
requirements of Article 3.6. The dispute shall remain on the DSB’s agenda until a mutually agreed
solution is notiﬁed.’
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